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Abstract 
Attempt has been made to identify dominant forms and factors for finance supply in Bulgarian 
farms. New Institutional and Transaction Costs Economics framework is used to estimate comparative 
efficiency of various modes for financing of short-term and long-term activities of farms of different type 
and size. Study is based on a large-scale microeconomic data collected through interviews with managers of 
0.5% of commercial farms in the country.   
Big transitional institutional, economic and behavioral uncertainty combined with high asset 
specificity and low recurrence of transactions, have blocked use of market debt financing of farms. Great 
variety of specific private modes have emerged to overcome funding difficulties and to govern dependant 
transactions (internal investment, personal contacts, share investment, interlinked organization). However, 
vast development and maintenance costs (“free riding”) have prevented formation of effective collective 
credit supply forms. Large third-party (Government, international assistance, NGO) intervention has also 
taken place to finance (directly or indirectly) farms or to assist market and private modes of funding of farm 
activities.  
Nevertheless, for majority of Bulgarian farms external funding is still either too expensive (high 
interest rate, unaffordable collateral requirements, immense paper work and bureaucratic procedures, big 
“side payments”) or not accessible at all. High transaction costs for “credit supply”, and “marketing”, and 
“contract enforcement” are the major factors limiting farm enlargement at present stage of transition. Along 
with further credit support, public involvement should be directed to enhancement of efficiency of State 
lending programs and improvement of general institutional environment (legislative framework, contract 
enforcement system, market infrastructure etc.).   
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Introduction 
There has been a fundamental transformation of Bulgarian agriculture since 1990 when 
transition to a market economy started. New institutional and farming structures have evolved; and 
a great variety of specific modes for land, and labor, and inputs, and capital supply have emerged 
for governing of transactions between agrarian agents (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001b). Despite all these 
unprecedented development there has been no large scale study on governing forms and 
microeconomic factors for finance supply in Bulgarian farms. Existing publications are either at 
“theoretical” level, or based on unreliable and scare official data. Moreover, traditional 
“neoclassical” framework still dominates in analysis of various agrarian organizations.  2
Consequently, character and real mechanisms for management of finance supply in transitional 
agriculture are little known to academic community, policymakers, and public at large.   
  New Institutional and Transaction Cost Economics is a powerful methodology for 
understanding of various modes for organization of economic activities (Williamson, 1996; 
Bachev and Tsuji, 2001a). According to that approach the choice of one or another form for 
governing of capital supply will depend on: institutional environment – existence of real private 
property rights on agrarian recourses, rights of contracting, efficient system for enforcement of 
individual rights and contracts, other formal and informal restrictions; and on level of transaction 
costs of available (and practically possible) alternative modes for organization of finance supply. 
Agrarian agents will extend farm size through some form of capital supply (internal investment; 
reciprocal,  joint or debt financing) only if it has comparative advantages to other modes for 
financing and farm enlargement (through land and/or labor supply contract, cooperation, merger, 
equity sell, vertical integration, off-farm investment). Ultimately the effective size (economic 
boundaries) of farm will be determined by the total costs for governing of finance supply, and land 
supply, and labor supply, and input supply, and marketing etc. Relative level of transacting costs 
will depend on: behavioral characteristics of agrarian agents (such as bounded rationality, 
tendency for opportunism, trust, reputation consideration), and on critical dimensions of each 
transactions (appropriability, asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency).   
In this paper a first attempt is being made to identify dominant forms and factors for 
finance supply in Bulgarian farms. The study is based on 2001 data collected through interviews 
with managers of 194 “typical” farms of different type and size in all major regions. The survey 
covers around 0,5% of commercial farms in the country
1. More than 38% of surveyed farms are 
unregistered “individual, family, or group farm”, almost 29% are “cooperatives”, and one-third has 
a status of “firm”. More than 45% of questioned farms self-determined themselves as “middle 
sized”, a little bit more than 38% as “small”, and 16.5% are “large” farms. 
 
MODES OF FINANCE SUPPLY 
Internal financing 
The major form for financing of activities of Bulgarian farms is “own sources” (Table 1). All 
existing farms in the country have emerged after post-communist privatization of agrarian 
recourses and reorganization (or liquidation) of previous farming organizations (cooperatives and 
state firms). Start up and development of these new farm structures have been associated with large 
                                                  
1  According to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry there are about 42000 “market oriented farms” in 
Bulgaria (2000 data). Most of them are unregistered farms (99.3%) cultivating 19.7% of total agricultural land. 
Registered 3125 cooperatives and 2275 agro-firms manage accordingly 61.6% and 18.7% of agricultural land.  3
farm-specific investments such as: training in farm management (education, learning by doing 
experience, studying outside experiences), organizational development (initiating, establishment, 
restructuring), building of reputation and brand name capital, finding proper specialization etc. 
There is no secondary market for such highly specific to a particular farm (human, intangible etc.) 
capital. When specificity of investment increases internal and outside financing are not alternative 
modes and “perfect substitute”. Therefore, equity or internal supply is the only possible way to 
finance such assets (Williamson, 1996, pp.184). Besides, in transitional conditions of high 
institutional, market, and behavioral uncertainty, most of traditional agrarian investments also 
happen to be in a regime of high specificity (“berried in land”). Finding out an independent market 
investor to finance such assets have been quite expensive (costs to find a supplier, efforts to 
negotiate loan terms, losses associated with meeting collateral requirements, premium interest rate 
or other “side payments”) or even impossible. Consequently, the internal rather than outside mode 
has been the most effective (or only possible) way to finance transactions supported by these assets 
(Bachev and Tsuji, 2001b, pp. 132). 
Our survey has founds that most farms which integrate inputs supply (in-house production) 
with high land or farm dependency use internal procurement for finance as well – accordingly 58% 
of farms with internal livestock feed supply, 55% - for seeds self-suppliers, and 43% - for own 
buildings suppliers. At the same time, share of farms which simultaneously supply inputs and 
finance internally is smaller for more universal and mobile asses – accordingly 28% of animals, 
6% for machinery, and only 4% for chemical self-suppliers. That proves that assets with low farm 
specificity tend to be financed by off-farm sources (e.g. loan contract). When specificity of 
transaction increases farms integrate not only finance but also input supply in order to protect 
dependant investments. 
 
Table 1 Share of farms using various sources for finance supply (percent) 






















short  long short  long short long short long short long short long short  long short  long short long
Unregistered 91.4  48.6 31.4  20  22.9 14.3 22.9 17.1 8.57 20  5.71 0 0  2.9  0 0 0 0 
Cooperative 81.5  48.1 7.41 7.4 25.9 3.7 55.6 22.2 3.7 11.1 18.5 11.1 0  3.7 11.1  0  0  0 
Firm  79.3  55.2 10.3 3.4 17.2 13.8 62.1 17.2 6.9 0  37.9 17.2 0  0  3.4 17.2 3.4 3.4
Small size  91.2  55.9 23.5  5.9  29.4 11.8 20.6 20.6 11.8 23.5 2.9 0 0  5.9  0 0 0 0 
Middle  size 81 40.5 14.3 19  19 14.3 52.4 21.4 4.76 4.8 31  19  0  0  9.5 2.4 2.4 2.4
Large size  75  62.5 12.5  0  12.5 0 75  6.2 0  0 25 0  0  0  0 25 0  0 
Total  84.6  50.5 17.6 11  22  11 45.1 18.7 6.6 11 19.8 8.8 0  2.2 4.4 5.5 1.1 1.1
Source: personal interviews   
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Another reason for domination of internal mode for finance supply has been high transacting 
costs for off-farm investments. In insecure transitional environment, investment in own farm has 
been more or the most effective way to use available financial resources. For a big number of 
households internal utilization of obtained (as a result of restitution, distribution, or privatization) 
and often non-tradable agrarian assets has been the only option to use productively available 
recourses (land, family labor, knowledge). That is how around 1.8 million self-sufficient farms 
have emerged in the country after 1990. 
Survival of a large number of (member oriented) production coops has been also based on 
advance payments for services trough system of orders (or commissioning contracts) with 
individual members. These cooperatives have integrated assets associated with highly specific 
activities to members - services to individual farms and households (e.g. food for households, feed 
for private animals), employment opportunities for members etc. Those are mainly assets with high 
indivisibility or with a great potential for economy of scale (and scope) unachievable within 
individual farm boundaries. Therefore, collective (joint ownership) mode has been broadly used to 
finance and govern such community-specific assets in order to overcome “missing market” 
situation, to avoid any unilateral outside dependency (monopoly), and to secure productive use of 
existing large-scale facilities.   
For commercial farms internal investment has been the most efficient way to use available 
financial resources as well. In highly risky financial markets (unstable nominal interest rate, boom 
of banks failures) direct internal control has been the cheapest (often the only possible) form to 
safeguard investments from outside opportunistic expropriation. Besides, investment in internal 
farm-specific assets (such as entrepreneurship, know-how etc.) has been much more productive 
since it brings higher than market (rates of interest, shares, Government bonds etc.) return on 
invested specialized capital. That is why large farms and firms (which tend to perform much more 
effectively) invest to a greater extend their capital in own long-term assets for increasing 
productivity. Moreover, even farms which could find easier (“often”) necessary funds from 
“outside sources” make internal investment in their own short and long-term assets - 30% and 13% 
of surveyed farms accordingly
2.    
Nevertheless, internal sources for financing are limited by family savings, coop members 
specific demand, internal profit generation etc. That puts severe restriction on effective farm 
enlargement through internal finance supply. When it is necessary only 15% and 41% of 
interviewed farms are able “always or often” to find outside supplier for their long-term and 
short-term financial needs. Only larger farms has a greater access to external financing for their 
                                                  
2  However, sharing investment is often a prerequisite for providing outside finance by a bank, investor, 
Government or international program.  5
short-term assets as 81% of them “often” find needed means.  Almost a half of surveyed farms do 
not use internal mode to finance long-term assets at all. Besides, some farms have been using other 
transactions to find additional sources for internal fubdind. According to our survey for all types of 
farms “financing other farm activities” has been a major reason for farmland sells-out and 
lease-out deals since 1990. 
Therefore, most farms need outside (mix) sources to sustain their activities. However, high 
transacting costs restrict or even block outside finance procurement. Consequently chronical 
underinvestment, limit of farm enlargement, backward technological development, unsustainable 
exploitation of natural resources (unbalance compensation of untaken N, P, and K; crop rotation 
problem; water, soil and air pollutions: lands erosion etc.) all have been wide-spreading among 
Bulgarian farms. For instance, most of surveyed farms report they need services which they 
actually do not provide – accordingly 61% of farms for supply of technological knowledge and 
advises, 50% - for mechanization services, 81% - for maintenance of machinery and equipment, 
56% - for spreading chemicals and pesticides, and 76% - for veterinary services. 
 
Market mode 
 “Flexibility”  of  financial recourses is considerable (Furuboth and Richter, 1998, pp. 137). It 
is very difficult (and costly) for creditor to monitor debtors and to control if loans are used 
effectively and purposely. That is especially true for agriculture where investments are hidden 
(“berried”) in land and therefore not observable at low cost. Moreover, other major agrarian assets 
are very “mobile” and liquid －e.g. animals and yields could be easily consumed or untraceably 
sold, machinery is “on wheel” etc. Hence, using major agrarian assets for safeguard as collateral is 
not always feasible. Agricultural land has been rarely accepted as guarantee against losses by 
commercial bank for the reason of lacking real titles (until recently) and low demand for purchase 
of farmland. On the other hand, farmers are not enthusiastic to offer their vital non-agrarian assets 
(e.g. houses) as collateral since farm investments are associated with of high risk.   
There have appeared many “new comers” on both sides of market (banks and farmers) and 
transacting parties usually do not know each other (no history of relations, trust is to be built). 
Costs for a first contract between unknown market contrtagents are much higher than for 
transacting with high recurrence between same partners (where keeping relationships has a special 
value). Consequently, in transitional conditions of big uncertainty, high information asymmetry, 
and strong incentive for opportunistic behavior (survival consideration, reputation does not matter), 
market has failed to organize effectively credit supply transactions in agriculture (Bachev and Tsuji, 
2001b, pp.135). Moreover, farms have access only to market dept financing since equity market for  6
trading agrarian shares have not developed at all in the country
3.  
Only one-fifth of farms use commercial banks for funding their short-term assets as share of 
farms using market for long-term capital procurement is twice lower (Table 1). Agro-firms and 
larger farms employ to a greater extent loan contracts for short-term finance supply. These farms 
can better meet market criteria for efficiency and for high collateral requirements. Besides, they 
have superior ability to face sunk costs for finding a creditor and for completing loan agreements. 
Foreign banks are still not active in short-term credit market.   
Only registered and middle-size farms utilize long-term credits from Bulgarian banks. 
Obviously creditors have preferences to formal organizations which liabilities could be easier 
(than individual persons) challenge in court throughout a longer period of time (effective life of 
investments). Internal long-term credit market entirely “fails” for small farms. Large farms also 
do not prefer “pure” market forms for financing their long-term activities since they have access 
to more economical modes for external finance. Foreign banks tend to finance long-term assets of 
unregistered and smaller farms. That is partly associated with their policy to support these types 
of organizations. Another major reason is that it is much easier for a foreign agent to monitor 
long-term investment in smaller and less diversify farms.   
For majority of farms the main reason for choosing market mode for short-term and 
long-term finance is “the best interest rate and terms of credit” (Table 2). It means that market 
(price) mechanisms govern well transactions for finance supply in these farms. Thus, majority of 
farms using Bulgarian commercial banks for finance procurement work according to the “rule of 
competition” meeting efficiency (pay–back) requirements and fulfilling their financial obligations. 
Another major reason for selecting that form, especially for long-term credit users, is the “lack of 
need to pay for successful project for financing”. That proves that market than other “hidden” 
price mediates effectively relations between supplier and debtor. However, for a great part of 
farms market form is the single (only possible) form for outside financing since “there are no 
other outside suppliers in the region”. Moreover, these farms have a single external lender and 
they are in situation of unilateral dependency. Consequently for a good number of Bulgarian 
farms there are only two (extreme) forms available for funding of their long-term activities – 
internal (own) supply and (“free”) market mode.   
For a significant part of debtors of bank short-term credit “tradition” also plays an important 
role. Long-term customer relationships between a farm and a bank are coupled with development 
of relation-specific capital. It helps overcoming problems of information deficiency (asymmetry), 
builds confidence between partners, restricts pre- and post-contract opportunistic behavior, and 
ultimately minimizes overall transacting costs for financial supply. Almost 74% of short-term 
                                                  
3  That could be also easily explained by transaction cost reasons.  7
credit users and a half of long-term debtors of Bulgarian banks indicate they are able “always or 
often” to find external financing when it is necessary. It means that transacting costs for market 
mode for user-farms are relatively small. However, no borrower from foreign banks reports that it 
is easy to find needed credit. 
 
Table 2 Share of farms using various finance suppliers* for a particular reason (percent) 

























Relatives,  short  31.3 50  0  37.5  25  0  0 
friends  long  30 20 0 0 0  0 10 
Cooperative,  short  30 50  15  60  35 15 10 
farm 
organization. 
long  40 40 0  40  40  0  0 
State  short  14.6 70.73  31.71  21.95  12.2 19.51  26.83 
program  long  35.3 82.35  23.53  23.53 0  0  0 
International  short  100 0 0  66.67  66.67  0  0 
program  long  40 40 0  40  40  0  0 
Bulgarian  short  11.1 72.22  5.56  16.67  16.67  0  38.89 
bank  long  62.5 62.5  0  0 37.5  0  0 
Bulgarian  short  0 100  25  25  0  0 75 
investor  long  0 20  20  20  80 0 0 
Foreign  short  0 100  100  100  0  0  0 
investor  long  0 100  100  100  0  0  0 
* Debtors of foreign banks have not indicated any of these reasons 
Source: personal interviews   
 
In environment of high economic and behavioral uncertainty other specific forms have also 
emerged to facilitate agrarian credit supply transactions. Share financing of investments with loan 
from Bulgarian banks and own resources is commonly used – accordingly by 62% of long-term 
credit users and one-third of short-term credit users. All debtors of foreign banks match loans with 
internal finance as well. This special (mixed) mode of finance supply increases farmers incentives 
for effective use of investment, divides risk between banks and users, and economize on total 
governance costs.  According to various clients different levels of credit volumes and equity 
requirements are practiced. Usually own sources are used for financing of more farm-specific 
assets (e.g. land and land improvement) while credit resources are directed to finance more 
universal and liquid assets. Internal financing is also necessary to secure effective collateral for 
lending contracts which is generally demanded to recover bank losses in case of investment failure.   
Correlation between own and bank financing is lower for short-term credit users where 67%  8
of (Bulgarian) bank users do not match credit supply with internal funding. Here “future crop” is 
usually used as a guarantee (“yield as collateral”) for loan contracts. Besides, bank often explicitly 
requests “purchase of insurance” to be made by credited farms. For instance, a half of short-term 
debtor-farms are obliged by relevant banks to buy insurance for vegetable yield, 31% - for cereal 
harvest, and 11% - for milk-cows. Such insurance is also requested for one-forth of cereals 
producers and one-third for cow owners which use long-term credits from Bulgarian banks. Since 
the risk of crop failure is immense lending banks require their collateral (future yields, 
milking-cows) to be protected (“insured”) from possible losses. Despite there unwillingness 
farmers have to pay the supplementary price for insurance supply in order to obtain needed 
(interlinked) bank credit. In this case risk is carried by a specialized market supplier (insurance 
company rather than bank) and debtor-farms are charged with extra (transaction) costs to assure 
bank loans.        
Another interesting form which has developed is to get “free agro-market information” from 
crediting Bulgarian bank – correspondingly 11% and 25% of farms using short-term and long-term 
credit. In this case farms receive “for free” additional service supply in package (interlinked) with 
credit supply contract. Banks gather or buy such information since it is vital for their investment, 
lending etc. decision-making. They offer this information to farms since they are interested in high 
efficiency of their clients investments (and timely return of banks loans). Here, economy of scale 
for organization of agro-market information supply is realized by bank and farms get specialized 
information supply though (in package with) lending contracts. This governance mode provides 
individual farms with a service which otherwise would be very expensive (to buy from market or 
to supply through a special private organization) or not available at all (blocking of market 
information supply transactions). Despite non under lending contracts, few of surveyed farms 
report getting other “free services” from banks – technological knowledge and advises, advises on 
protecting from diseases and predators, veterinary assistance, and farm management counsels. 
Apparently banks farming related services will be extending along with expansion of their agrarian 
credit activities and number of their prospective customers.   
Despite “enormous” development of agrarian credit markets since the beginning of transition, 
majority of Bulgarian farms still do not use market for organization of their financial supply. In 
some instances market mode happens to be quite expensive – e.g. “too high” interest rate and other 
related “payments”, lost flexibility (and efficiency) of agrarian recourses put (as collateral) under 
bank’s control. In other cases, market form has not been accessible at all - missing market situation. 
Subsequently, farms have been looking for and designing more efficient non-market  (private, 




Using of “relatives and friends” as external suppliers of capital has been very popular in rural 
communities. It was especially common in the beginning of transition when uncertainty was so 
high that personal ties and trust (“bilateral reputation mechanism”) governed most of economic 
transactions at national and even at transnational scales (Bachev and Tsuji, 2001b, pp.128). This 
mode for outside supply is still dominant for a good part of “individual, family and group farms” 
of all size for short-term financing, and for unregistered and middle-size farms for long-term 
finance supply (Table 1). For a significant part of farms that is the singe mode for outside funding 
(Table 2). Costs for negotiating and for contract enforcement are low since economic transactions 
are governed by “good-will” and personal trust between partners (usually as a part of broader 
friendships or family relationships). Often there is no formal contract writing and registration, or 
any collateral requirements. Disputes associated with contract execution are less likely and they 
are easily overcome with no substantial efforts or needs for a third party (e.g. court) involvement. 
Besides, a “preferential” (not rare zero) interest rate is habitually applied and there is greater 
flexibility for loan terms.   
In certain cases such outside “support” of activities of smaller farms is a part of interlinked 
“direct marketing” deals. Since market food prices are quite high for the pocket of mass consumers, 
and there is high uncertainty of quality of “free marketed” products (e.g. high level of residual 
chemicals; uncertain origin etc.), many urbane households use personal and family ties to supply 
cheap and secure
4  farm products though system of advance (or current) orders and financing. 
Regardless of its relative efficiency “relative-friendship” form can not be a permanent mode 
for finance supply. There are “natural limits” of available (free, preferential) outside sources of that 
kind. While majority of farms (68%) using short-term crediting through this mode report they 
“always or often” find external sources when it is needed, no respondent confirms such state for 
long-term credit needs. Besides, when “farm efficiency” is not a criteria for investment decision 
making neither form can be sustainable in a long-run. Therefore, personal relations will be used as 
supplementary and eventually as a “last resort” financing mode.   
 
Vertical integration 
Share of Bulgarian farms which get a financial supply from an outside investor is still low – 
just over 5% and 6% for short and long-term financing accordingly. Most of the suppliers are 
Bulgarian investors. They tend to finance working capital of registered middle-size organizations 
(cooperatives and companies). Proportion of large agro-firms which get direct funding of 
long-term investment is quite big. Foreign investors finance entirely investments in middle-size 
                                                  
4  Food security is becoming important issue particularly for new rich and middle class Bulgarians.  10
firms.  
Evolution of this specific private mode for financing of farming activities is determined by 
strong relation specificity of farm investments to an outside buyer of agrarian output. That is either 
bilateral (e.g. capacity, time of delivery etc.) or most often unilateral dependency of farm assets 
from a particular processor, retailer, or exporter. Such assets are usually associated with some 
specification of products (“special” quality or production technology, “special” origin) which is of 
big importance for a buyer (vine producer, meat and dairy processor, produces of caned vegetable 
and fruit etc.). For the reason of high specificity of such investments to a particular (single) buyer 
they hardly could be financed by an independent outside supplier. Here risk from opportunistic 
behavior in post-contract (investment) stage in enormous. Farms also would not make dependent 
investments unless they safeguard them with some effective governing form (long-term contract, 
taking economic “hostages”, or join investment). Therefore, either underinvestment in specialized 
capital (hold-up), or direct external (coo) investment by interested vertical partner. Our survey 
shows that all farms getting such funding of their long-term investments also provide internal 
supply. For short-term investments this share is 25% for Bulgarian and 100% for foreign investors. 
Since farms are in big shortage of working capital local investors (processor, trader) traditionally 
provide advance payments (financing current inputs supply) for interlinked future marketing deals.     
This mode for financial supply usually is a part of a larger contract(s) for governing of 
vertical links - reciprocial marketing, inputs and know-how supply, joint ventures etc. Participated 
farms get some interest, collateral etc. preferences as a part of entire deal. On the other hand, the 
legal form of business organization (namely “agro-firm”) becomes important since it allows to 
build formal partnerships (e.g. direct participation in Management Boards), brand name capital, 
daughter organizations etc., and to dispute them before a third party (e.g. court, Government 
authority, international arbitrage). Not rare such farms have been initiated (or taken over) from 
outside (off-farm) interests and develop as part of diversification strategy of special business 
groups (bank, industrial etc). Nevertheless, unilateral dependency from downstream industries 
dominates. Only less than 9% of farms supported by Bulgarian investors point out they are “often” 
able to find needed short-term financial resource from outside sources (no farm gets an easy 
long-term external funding). Therefore, development and maintaining that vertical integration do 
not cost less for participating farms.     
Emergence of direct financing by foreign investors is greatly associated with formal 
restrictions for foreigners to buy agricultural land. That is why such a joint venture with local firm 
is merely feasible way to govern foreign direct investment in farming sector. Therefore, farms 
which use that mode get extremely favorable interest, terms, collateral, and overall paper work 
treatment (like “own” finance supply). At the same timer, that is not low-cost mode for outside 
financing – no farm credited by foreign investor testifies it is easy to obtain external financing  11
when  it  is  required.      
 
Interlinked arrangements 
Agrarian agents also invent more complicated forms to mitigate problems and facilitate 
financial transactions. Interlinked organization has been widely used to govern exchange between 
farms and input suppliers.   
For a good part of farms a major factor for choosing a particular supplier of inputs (animals 
are an exception) is “delayed (portion) payments” (Figure 1). In fact that mode interlinks input 
with credit supply. In agriculture investments in short and long-term assets usually require longer 
pay-back period (at least until next harvest season). Therefore, delayed or fraction payment for 
outside input supply represent parallel lending (free or low interest) short or long-term credit by a 
supplier. Such interlinked organization (“input supply plus crediting”) facilitate transactions, 
minimize overall costs for their management, intensify inputs supply and relationships between 
contragents.      















Bui l di ngs
M achi neri es











Smal l  size
Mi ddl e si ze
Large  si ze
 
Source: personal interviews 
 
Supplying physical assets “in package” with crediting (“loan in kind”) is beneficial for farms 
since: it either saves own finance of significant capital investments; or economize costs for finding  12
and servicing outside credit (from a commercial bank or another private agent). In situation of vast 
shortage of own sources and high costs for external credit supply, that is often the only available 
form for enlargement (preserving) farms sizes. 
On the other hand, suppliers have greater opportunities for low-costs credit supply. They are 
often large companies producing or exporting machineries, chemicals, feeds etc., and possessing 
significant internal finance or cheap access to outside loans (large clients with bigger possibility 
for guarantee, collateral; preferential interest and term conditions; effective ability for 
minimization of risk and confronting losses from non-payments etc.). Efficiency of supplier’s 
credit recourses is assured by higher turnover of main products and by scale economy on 
transactions (e.g. funding of a singe credit for financing of large sells to numerous farms). 
Moreover, suppliers are frequently a mediator who gets subsidized credit by chief supplier, or 
undertakes own preferential financing for farms.     
Not rare such an interlinked supply of long-term assets in fact represent leasing (rent) rather 
than sell of these actives. That specific form for governing of transactions with inputs supply 
industries correspond to development of particular lease market for some types of long-term 
agrarian assets. Level of transacting costs for management (monitoring, control) of lease contract 
is determined by character of financing assets: more universal and easy to supervise assets (large 
machinery, building etc.) are frequent subjects of such deals. At the same time, there is no lease 
market for productive animals (which could be easily consumed or resold) and purchase is the 
major form for outside supply of these farm assets.     
 
Collective organizations 
One out of five Bulgarian farms use “cooperative or farm organization” as an outside 
finance supplier (Table 1). Collective supply form is more important for short-term financial needs 
of smaller farms and for long-term funding of not-large and non-cooperative farms. Main reasons 
for selecting that mode of financing are related to comparative efficiency and low costs: “small 
paper work and bureaucratic procedures”, “best interest rate and terms”, and “lack of need to pay 
for successful project for financing” (Table 2). However, for a good number of farms that is the 
“only source for outside financing” of their long and short-term activities. More than 79% of farms 
getting short-term funding trough that mode, and a half of long-term credit users, report they 
“always or often” are able to find external crediting they need. Therefore, when market fails or 
when market procurement is quite expensive, farms need, develop, and use own special private 
organizations for finance supply.     
Evolution of joint (collective) ownership mode for farm finance supply has been very 
difficult in Bulgaria. There were no traditions in farm association in the country. Transaction costs 
for initiation and maintenance of large-members organizations are quite high. Most of farms want  13
to use benefits of collective organization but to avoid development costs (“free-riding problem”). 
That is why private organizations of that kind emerge very slowly (through “decentralized 
collective actions”) and they are not sustainable in a long-run. Besides, it is not possible an 
effective control on cooperative management by individual members. Also incentives for equity 
investment are low since individual influence on policy and receiving benefit (individual use of 
organization, profit distribution etc.) is independent from invested capital (Cook, 1995, pp.1153). 
Finally, the farms which need collective support the most (potential membership) are extremely 
poor to contribute significantly to that financial joint venture.   
A number of farm credit organizations have been initiated by private interest groups or by a 
third party (Government, international assistance program, NGO). Because of corruption and 
mismanagement some of them failed (Bank of Agrarian Cooperatives, Bank for Agrarian Credit). 
Recently established Federation of Rural Mutual Credit Associations has got some success partly 
due to the significant public support in creation, initial granting of “equity” capital, and in exterior 
supervision. However it has been experiencing difficulties extending its activities since exterior 
support was suspended. Some non-specialized in crediting farm organizations (inputs supply, 
marketing or producers cooperatives; professional association) also have credit programs. 
However, this activity is very limited and specialized - e.g. prioritized lending for breading animal, 
promotion of new products, introduction of know-how etc. Most of these organizations are “too 
small” to provide effective farm financing - to accumulate recourses, to realize economy of scale 
(and scope) on specialized lending activities etc. In some cases, they also heavily rely on a third 
party (Government, international assistance, NGO) support to carry out their activities.   
Therefore, despite the obvious advantages of collective finance supply organizations in 
resource accumulation, risk sharing, non for profit operations, crediting preferences, “democratic” 
management etc., they can hardly develop as a pure private mode in transitional conditions. 
 
Trilateral and hybrid forms 
The main form for external funding for majority of Bulgarian farms is “some kind of state 
program for agriculture” (Table 1). During whole transition period agrarian credit market has been 
blocked in the country and Government intervention in finance supply has made carrying farming 
possible. Government assistance has been predominantly directed to providing preferential credit 
for working capital for particular productions (mainly cereals). In last few years preferential 
long-term funding programs have been also made available for some priority areas (growing 
vineyard, purchasing machinery, modernization rural infrastructure, recovering traditional 
productions etc.). Most of programs come with subsidized interest rate, and facile term and 
collateral requirements. Schemes with partially granted-credit have also been introduced recently 
(part of the loan is forgiven after investments are made). Thus along with necessary credit farms  14
get “extra” additional financing through subsidized loan price, forgiven debt, or increased 
flexibility of own resources. In most cases there is a requirement for sharing investment (and risk) 
by acquiring farms aiming to increase incentives for efficiency. Public supply form is preferred by 
most of using farms because of “best interest and term” motivation (Table 2). However, best 
collateral and paper work associated with this mode is also important for a good number of 
applying farms. 
Different types of farms do not have an equal access to public funds for financing of their 
activities. Major beneficiaries of preferential short-term credit are registered bigger farms. These 
farms have larger needs for working capital and they are very active looking for cheap external 
support. They have also got better experience in preparation of project proposals and lobbying for 
their successful funding. Besides, they develop special relation-specific capital with funding 
agencies (personal ties, good reputation etc.) and have effective capacity for “under the counter” 
payments (bribes) for projects approval. Finally, larger farms are more important in political and 
economic respects (powerful agents, major suppliers for internal and export markets) and therefore 
have easy access to Government support. However, larger farms do not use much this mode for 
funding their long-term assets. They have either greater internal capacity (profit generation, equity 
sell) to cover their long-term needs or effective access to cheaper outside sources for financing 
(private investors, banks etc.). Formal status and “registration” of farms is important for executing 
agency since it is easier (less costly) to check history and reliability of farms, and to enforce legal 
agreements and liabilities.   
For a good number of Bulgarian farms state funding of long-term assets is the only way for 
external finance supply. This mode is vital for a significant number of farms since 53% of users of 
long-term and 17% of users of short-term credits from various Government programs do not have 
internal financing at all. For farms which get funding through that form it is a cost-effective mode 
to meet their financial (short and long-term) needs. All involved farms indicate they “always or 
often” have an access to outside financing when it is necessary.   
Part of State financing comes through hybrid modes. In some instances, these modes are 
purely public – when international (e.g. European Union, World Bank, other donor) funds for 
farming support are match (shared) by Government contribution – e.g. SAPARTD. In other cases, 
public credit goes through private banks. Later hybrid mode allows minimizing overall costs for 
public lending since programs are executed (and risk bearded) by specialized private agents. Banks 
are much more efficient than public agency in servicing credit supply, in selecting clients, in  15
controlling contract terms, in monitoring loan repayments, in securing collateral etc
5. In some 
cases risk is assumed by the state agency against acquisition of agricultural land since most banks 
do not accept farmland as collateral.   
Other forms have also been practiced for direct or indirect public financing of farm activities: 
assisting farm associations and funding their activities; exemption form taxes on agricultural land 
and farm activities; guaranteed minimum prices for some products (e.g. tobacco); providing free 
agro-market information and extension service supply; public funding of agrarian research and 
innovation etc. These trilateral modes either assist (public funding, public in-house production, 
public supply etc.) important agrarian transactions which could not be carried out effectively 
through market or private modes; or accelerate development of “private” (quasi-public) 
organization for collective supply which otherwise would not emerge; or they are associated with 
securing additional own (internal) finance for farms. Some other instruments have also been used 
to facilitate market and private financial transacting. For instance, a system of “trade with receipt 
on deposited grain in public warehouses” has been institutionalized. That has made possible 
separation of moment of marketing from inputs supply transactions. Farms are now able to use 
their grain-receipts as a collateral and to get short-term lending for working capital while looking 
for the most favorable date for marketing (usually grain prices are lowest after harvesting time 
when need for working capital for next season is high).                 
A great number of smaller and mainly non-cooperative farms get outside supply from 
“European Union, World Bank, another international farm program” (Table 1). Targeting such 
weak (vulnerable) farm groups has been a policy priority for these donors programs. In fact, for all 
users of that mode of short-term finance, and for a significant share of long-tern debtors, that is the 
single mode available for external funding. Moreover, a great share of farms using that mode does 
not apply (have) any internal financing of their activities – one-third and 40% for short and 
long-term credit users accordingly. Other major reasons for short-term users for selecting that form 
are simplified procedures and lack of side-payments. In addition to that the best interest rate and 
terms (unusually preferential) are also important factor for long-term debtors in choosing an 
international supplier. All participants in long-term international lending program point out there 
are able to find “always and often” external financing they need. Conversely, less than 12% of 
users of that mode are positive about their short-term needs. That is partly associated with 
(long-term assistance) policy priority of donor agencies, partly with low costs for supervision of 
effective (purposely) utilization of loans。 While it is easy to monitor acquisition of new machinery, 
                                                  
5  Big number of bad dept-holders from State Fund Agriculture, or large share of unused funds from 
SAPARD - to name just two “good” examples for low (bad) operational efficiency of public agencies in 
farm crediting.  16
building of farm facilities, real investments in working capital are often quite expensive to verify 
(e.g. amount of paid salaries, fees for services, short-term inputs in land etc.). 
Since the beginning of transition there have been a number of international institutional, 
Governmental, NGO`s etc. initiatives targeting farming in some regions (mountains, borders, less 
populated, undeveloped); or minority groups (Turkish, gypsies); or young (future）farmers; or 
segments of population (handicaps, drug users); or with specific purposes (education, extension, 
demonstration). All these forms for international intervention has come to fill the gap when 
internal a third party (Government, local authority, private) involvement in farm finance supply 
either failed (capacity and competence deficiency, lack of budget recourses) or has not been quite 
efficient (bad planning, mismanagement, or corruption).     
 
TRANSACTION COSTS FOR FINANCIAL SUPPLY   
Efficiency of external procurement 
For different types of farms there are diverse reasons for selecting the mode of financial 
supply (Table 3). For majority of farms the most important factor for short-term supply is the 
immediate payments (best interest) and terms related to financing. Dominant “market” criteria are 
essential for good part of registered middle-size farms as well. It means that official price and 
conditions (competition for available market and institutional sources) govern financing supply. 
However, for a big fraction of farms economizing on overall transacting costs (related paper work, 
side payments) is also important for choice of financing mode. In addition, receiving interlinked 
services and tradition are crucial for larger operators. Later modes are associated with extra 
transacting benefits and further cost cuts. Nevertheless, for a great proportion of Bulgarian farms 
there is no alternative form for financial procurement. These farms do not have access to another 
supplier, and they either have to accept financing situation (internal restrictions, bilateral relations, 
or monopoly situation) or to reduce farm size.   
Frequency of finance supply transactions “with a particular partner” (or “mainly with the 
same partner”) is quite high for all type of farms. High recurrence of relations between same 
parties minimizes transaction costs since there are strong mutual incentives to continue bilateral 
relations and self-restrict opportunism. Besides, it is efficient to invest in relation-specific capital 
(building good reputation, gathering information about contragent, developing trust and 
mechanisms for coordination, interlinking of exchanges) because such costs can be easily 
recovered by multiple transactions. No more than 9% of surveyed farms report they “use many 
suppliers” for short-term and 12% for long-term crediting. As far as short-term financing is 
concerned, those are mainly large farms which have bigger needs for funding. They diversify 
suppliers according to investment characteristics (and minimize total costs for finance supply), or 
simply avoid dependency from a sole lender. For long-term supply, these are predominately  17
middle-size firms which can not assure their growing financial needs (associated with their 
strategy for expansion) from a single supplier.   
 





















   short  long  short  long short  long Short long short long short long short long
Unregistered 34.3 28.6 45.7  17.1 5.71 5.71 34.3 14.3 31.4  8.57  0  0 2.86 8.57
Cooperative 18.5 33.3  63  33.3 22.2 3.7 29.6 7.41 14.8 3.7  11.1  0 18.5 7.41
Firm  24.1 10.3 58.6  44.8 31 17.2 17.2 10.3 27.6  24.1 27.6  0 27.6 13.8
Small size  41.2 35.3 41.2  17.6 8.82 5.88 38.2 17.6 32.4  11.8  0  0 0 5.88
Middle-seize 14.3 19 71.4  42.9 31 11.9 16.7 7.14 23.8  7.14 14.3  0 14.3 9.52
Large size  25 12.5 37.5  25 6.25 6.25 31.3 6.25 12.5  25 31.3  0 50 18.8
Total  26.1 23.9 54.3  30.4 18.5 8.7 27.2 10.9 25  12  12  0 15.2 9.78
Source: personal interviews 
 
  “State program” and “cooperative, farm organization” are chief short-term lenders for most 
of farms indicating they use “always or mainly the same supplier” (80% and 64% accordingly). 
High frequency with “Bulgarian banks” and “relatives, friends” is important for short-term 
financing of 39% and 28% of farms while recurrence with Bulgarian and foreign investors are only 
for few farms (less than 7% and 2% correspondingly). For long-term repeated financing major 
sources are: “Bulgarian investor” (74%) and “State program” (52%). “Cooperative, farm 
organization” and “relatives, friends” are significant for good number of farms with unchangeable 
lenders (36% and 31% accordingly) while “foreign investor” - for around 7% of them. No farm 
states having any repeated financial supply from a foreign bank or long-term supply from a 
Bulgarian bank. As far as regular (frequent) transactions between same partners is an important 
factor for costs saving for both sides, above figures give some ideas about most likely external 
creditors for further enlargement of Bulgarian farms. 
Organization of finance supply from a new supplier is usually associated with large costs (to 
find a “good” lender, to negotiate satisfactory contract terms, to present reliable guarantee, to pay 
premium interests or side payments etc.). That is why no short-term supplying farm and lees than 
9% of long-term external finance users “change partner every time”. Mostly smaller (exclusively 
unregistered and firms) farms look for a new supplier since they are having greater problems to 
find external funding (new comer, no proper collateral, greater financing needs for modernization 
and extension). 
“Relationships with banks and preparation of projects for crediting” takes high efforts and  18
time for all type of farms. More than 45% of surveyed farms report “great efforts” for credit supply, 
l6.5% - “moderate level”, and only less than 9% “insignificant”. For various types of farms overall 
transacting costs for credit supply (both for “successful” and “failed” projects) are different. Their 
level is greatest for most of large farms and firms (69% and 59% accordingly), for many 
middle-size farms and cooperatives (48% and 43%), and for a third of unregistered and small 
farms. Different farms have unequal needs for external finance and divers potential (skills, 
reputation, ties etc.) to govern credit supply transactions. Nonetheless the superior amount of these 
costs in larger farms, their relative level (for a unit of transaction) is smaller since they can explore 
the economy of scale (and scope) on credit supplying activity (e.g. investing in specialized human 
or relation capital for dealing with lending agencies; negotiating a package credit contract for 
funding of a number of activities  etc.).  ,  
Moreover, credited farms spent different efforts to deal with various suppliers. Only a minor 
share (10% or less) of farms with lenders Bulgarian or foreign investors, and international program 
as well as long-term banks and State program, report high efforts devoted for credit supply deals. 
At the same time, a relatively large portion of farms with high efforts are debtors to State, and 
Bulgarian banks short-term crediting program (45% and 25% accordingly), and “cooperative, farm 
organization” financing (for short and long-term projects - 32% and 16% accordingly). Short-term 
financing from major suppliers involve larger transacting costs for farms because of “short-term” 
nature of contract (and needs for periodical recontracting). Besides, transactions with outside 
investors are much more smoothly given existing high bilateral (assets) dependency and strong 
incentives to reach a deal with minimum costs. Lastly, transacting efforts with international donors 
are small since these programs are strongly prioritized for particular type of farms (here “small 
number condition” prevails on  both  sides).       
 
Transacting problems   
For majority of Bulgarian farms “high collateral requirement” is the main factor limiting 
financial supply (Table 4). Most of agrarian assets are highly farm-specific and therefore less 
suitable to be used as a guarantee for outside (e.g. non agrarian) supplier. Market value of such 
property is much lower than in-farm significance. Thus external supplier wanting to safeguard 
lending transactions against possible opportunism (misuse, delay of return, or expropriation) 
demands “too high” securities from farm’s point of view. Hence such high requirement for 
“economic hostages” (or “unequal” exchange) restricts or even blocks credit supply contracts. Yet 
another critical factor for numerous farms is high price (interest and term) of credit resources. 
Apparently many Bulgarian farms can not use financial funds effectively according to market 
criteria or requirements of lending organizations. 
  19
























    short long  short long  short long  short   long  short  long  short  long 
Unregistered 45.71 31.43 17.14 5.71  60  31.43 40  51.43  40  22.86 22.86 31.43
Cooperative 51.85 40.74  14.81 0  25.93 25.93 48.15 66.67 55.56  40.74 40.74 40.74
Firm  55.17 51.72 24.14 13.79 13.79 24.14 79.31  58.62 44.83 37.93 55.17 20.69
Small size  50 35.29  5.88  0  50 29.41 38.24  58.82  47.06  29.41 20.59 35.29
Middle size  50  42.86  30.95 14.29 19.05 19.05 71.43  66.67  42.86  40.48 42.86 30.95
Large size  50 43.75  12.5  0  43.75 43.75 43.75  31.25 50 18.75 62.5  18.75
Total  50 40.22  18.48 6.52  34.78 27.17 54.35  57.61  45.65  32.61 38.04 30.43
Source: personal interviews 
 
Significant share of farms feel there is no agrarian credit available in the country. High 
transaction costs make difficult emergence of market and private modes for credit supply, and 
plentiful farms still have no access to external financing. For some part of farms shortage of 
information about finance opportunities is a principal reason complicating credit supply. Obviously 
information asymmetry is quite high in the area and for many farms is too expensive (impossible) 
to get necessary information for funding possibilities. Finally, some farms face enormous credit 
related costs (preparation of proposals, bureaucratic procedures, payments of fees and bribes etc.) 
which limits or make impossible finance supply transactions.   
Furthermore, a number of unwanted forms for off-farm supply have been practicing. Delay of 
payments or non-payments by downstream partners (middlemen, processors etc.) has been 
widespread. That is in fact unwelcome (usually interest free) crediting of trading partners. For the 
reason of strong unilateral dependency (monopoly) and (or) high enforcement costs of contracted 
terms (through inefficient and expensive court system) farms has to accept that form of 
“subsidized marketing”. Most farms with “bad experience” in that respect either under-invest in 
specific capital (change or diversify production structure, decrease operations) or look for more 
efficient forms for governing of (marketing) transactions - deposit and advance payment, using 
own organization (marketing cooperative) or personal contacts, internal integration (in-farm 
processing), joint investment with trading partners etc. Besides, a number of undesired off-farm 
“financing” has been common place – e.g. funding of private activities of corrupted government 
officials (informal stakeholders), or special interest groups in cooperatives and agro-companies; 
buying “security services” of criminal firms; loosing large equity or deposits in bankrupt banks etc. 
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Limits of farm enlargements 
There are two groups of factors which restrict increasing farms size – institutional restrains 
(e.g. to buy or lease-in land up to a certain limit or by certain agents, production and marketing 
quotas etc.), and overall costs for governing of farm transactions. Therefore, if breaking formal 
institutional restrictions is associated with high transaction costs (good enforcement and high 
penalty for offenders), and governance of transactions under a single management is very 
expensive (high level of internal and outside costs of transacting), farm size stays beyond 
technologically optimal level. Major factor limiting farm extension which is generally identified is 
enormous costs for enforcement (monitoring, measuring, controlling) of non-family labor 
contracts
6. Consequently, even though farms had unlimited cheap access to external financing farm 
borders would be eventually limited by internal labor supply costs (instead of technology 
frontiers). 
For the majority of Bulgarian farms the highest management (transaction) costs are 
associated with “credit supply”, and “marketing”, and “contract enforcement”
7. Around 45% of 
surveyed farms devote “high efforts and time” for “relationships with banks and for preparation of 
projects for crediting”, and for “finding markets for marketing of output”, and for “contract 
enforcement”. Therefore, besides high governing costs for enforcement of labor contracts, other 
factors restricting farm enlargement of Bulgarian farms are high enforcement costs of contracts in 
general as well as enormous credit supply and marketing costs.     
Almost two-third of Bulgarian commercial farms indicates their intention to “enlarge farm 
size” in future, including 91% of firms, 81% of large and 66% of middle-size farms, 59% of 
unregistered and small farms, and 46% of cooperatives. For majority of surveyed farms “main 
factors for development of their farms” relate to improvement of institutional environment – 
“guaranteed marketing”, “enforcement of Laws and private contracts”, “macro-economic stability”, 
“legislation framework”, “access to free markets” (Figure 2). Accumulated specific capital in form 
of “own and family experience” receives also a high priority
8. “Enlarged access to agrarian credit” 
                                                  
6  That is why owner-operated farm is the most common form of farming organization around the world 
(Hayami and Otsuka, 1993, pp.11). 
7  Share of farms with great costs for “finding inputs suppliers”, “contracting”, and “information supply” is 
moderate (28-32%), while for “finding land suppliers”, “relationships with administration”, “registration 
regimes”, “finding new workers”, and “dealing with professional organizations” is only 15-22%. 
8  Managerial skill is the key factor for the success of farms in any institutional and market environment. 
Out of hundred of thousands “commercial” farms which emerged after 1990 only part survived nowadays. 
For many agrarian agents have become cheaper to trade (sell, lease-out) available recourses instead of 
internal organisation of land and labour in own farm under poor management.      21
is among the chief factors for farms development, and it has superior importance for large, 
middle-size, and registered farms. There is bigger need for cheap external finance in these farms 
and for that reason they appreciate more amelioration of crediting opportunities.     
Our study has found no correlation between period of creation and difficulties farms 
experience in finding source for external financing. Proportion of farms facing problems with 
outside funding (which “never or rare“ find needed credit) is high and independent of date of 
formation of farms (recently established; with 4, 6 year or longer history). Therefore, managers 
success in obtaining necessary financial means depends more on their ability (personal ties, skills, 
other means) to find creditor rather on “natural” characteristic of farm investment (the stage of 
financial cycle, assets specificity etc.) or accumulated “learning by-doing experience” in credit 
supply.  
According to our survey most of farms (75%) which buy land or repeatedly lease-in land 
finance their activities from own sources. Number of purchasers of farmland which are credited by 
external supplier is positive only for long-term debtors of international and national programs, 
Bulgarian banks, and “cooperatives, farm organizations” – 50%, 38%, 31% and 25% of farms 
accordingly. As far as frequent land-leasers are concerned, that figure is positive for short-term 
debtors of State program, Bulgarian banks, “cooperatives, farm organization”, “relatives, friends”, 
and Bulgarian investors – 59%, 26%, 18%, 10% and 8% correspondingly. External suppliers are 
reluctant to finance acquisition (supply) of farmland because of high farm specificity of such 
investment. Therefore, most feasible source for financing of  further farms enlargement through 
land supply will be internal funding. Besides, farms credited by international and state programs, 
and to lesser extend by Bulgarian banks, are more likely to extend their size through additional 
land supply.   
Similar correlation also exists between hiring labor and financing of farms. More than 81% 
of farms which hire labor fund their short-term activity by own sources. Only share of hiring farms 
credited by State program is relatively bigger (47%) while other debtors use that mode for farm 
extension to a lesser extend (19% from Bulgarian banks and “cooperatives, farm organizations”; 
14% from “relatives, friends”; 8% from international program; 5% from Bulgarian investor; and 
1% from foreign investors). Therefore, farms funded by internal sources and State program are 
more likely to enlarge farm size through labor supply contracts.   
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Figure 2 Share of farms estimating as "high" importance of veriouse factors
for their particular farm development
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Source: personal interviews 
 
Conclusions 
The goal of this paper was to identify and estimate comparative efficiency of dominant forms 
for finance supply in Bulgarian farms Unlike traditional textbook logic (“everybody invests in 
markets”, “everybody gets needed credit from markets”) there have emerged a great variety of 
specific modes for financing of transitional farming. Evolution and factors of all these governance 
structures could only be understood within transaction cost minimizing (comparative institutional 
analysis) framework.   
Big institutional, economic, and behavioral uncertainty combined with high assets specificity 
and low recurrence of transactions, have blocked formation of agrarian credit markets in the 
country. Market “failed” to organize financial supply but agrarian agents have developed various 
private (non market, mixed) modes to overcome funding difficulties and to govern their dependent 
transactions (internal investment, personal contacts, share investment, interlinked organization). 
However, private sector (bilateral and multilateral private modes) also “failed” to fill the “funding 
gap” to the sufficient extend. Large third-party (Government, international assistance, NGO) 
intervention in credit supply has been necessary to make farming more efficient (or possible at all).  23
Different forms for direct or indirect public financing of farms have taken place, and a range of 
third party assistance in market and private modes has occurred.   
Nevertheless, majority of Bulgarian farms still have no facile access to external funds they 
need for effective farm enlargement. Along with further credit support, public involvement should 
be directed to enhancement of efficiency of State lending programs and improvement of general 
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